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COMMENT
Tariffication of the Coastwise Trade Laws
Keith E. Diggs*
The coastwise trade laws prohibit foreign vessels and mariners from transport-
ing goods or passengers between American ports. These anticompetitive laws
punish American producers and consumers yet barely sustain a dwindling
merchant marine. Every attempt to repeal the laws encounters insurmounta-
ble political resistance. Reformers of the coastwise trade laws, then, should
instead try to convert the prohibition on foreign involvement into a tariff.
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Introduction
“Americans put a sort of heroism into their manner of doing commerce.”1
America’s maritime shipping industry amazed Alexis de Tocqueville
when he visited the young country in the 1830s. American ships dominated
the market, both at home and abroad. The Frenchman attributed America’s
“maritime genius” to the fact that its merchant marine could “cross the seas
most cheaply,” not because of any inherent material advantage but rather
because of its mariners’ competitive spirit.2
Tocqueville would scarcely recognize the industry today. The registries
of Panama and Liberia easily eclipse that of America in number of ships and
tonnage capacity,3 while South Korea and China lead in shipbuilding, as Asia
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, University of Michigan Law School. I thank Rachel Braver,
Maggie Mettler, and my parents for their encouragement, along with my fellow Michigan Law
Review editors for their underappreciated work in bringing this to publication.
1. Alexis de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America pt. 2, ch. 10, at 387 (Harvey C.
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835).
2. See id. at 385–87.
3. Elizabeth R. DeSombre, Flagging Standards 71–72 (2006).
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has become the industry’s epicenter.4 America’s international maritime
trade is now “largely the domain of foreign ships”5 flying what labor unions
pejoratively call “flags of convenience”;6 the country’s coastwise trade7 is at
the mercy of a monopoly that Congress grants American ships, shipyards,
ship owners, and sailors against foreign competition. Outcompeted in inter-
national maritime shipping, the American industry survives in the coastwise
trade not because of its maritime genius but instead because Congress keeps
the foreign geniuses out.
This Comment focuses on the coastwise trade monopoly. Two laws—
the Jones Act and the Passenger Services Act8—reserve the coastwise trans-
portation of goods and passengers, respectively, for American-built ships
owned by Americans employing American crews and documented under
American laws. The idea is to protect the merchant marine9 and its capacity
to serve as a “naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emer-
gency.”10 Supporters buttress this argument with concerns about the preser-
vation of American jobs,11 but the merchant marine has sharply declined
despite its monopoly on coastwise trade. Moreover, the monopoly forces
American producers and consumers requiring maritime transportation be-
tween U.S. ports to bear the near-triple costs of operating American-flagged
vessels.12
4. See Joanne Chiu & Kyong-Ae Choi, For Shipping Sector, More Defaults Likely, Wall
St. J., Mar. 5, 2012, at B2, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB40001424052970
203986604577256882637252906.
5. Ariel Kaminer, New Hope for Turnaround at Troubled Service Academy, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 31, 2012, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/education/at-troubled-
merchant-marine-academy-hope-for-a-turnaround.html.
6. For instance, a ship owned and operated by an American citizen, but registered in
Liberia due to its lax shipping regulations and minimal registration costs, would be said to fly
a “flag of convenience.” E.g., Flags of Convenience Campaign, Int’l Transp. Workers’ Fed’n,
http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
7. “[T]ransportation of merchandise by water, or by land and water, between points in
the United States . . . either directly or via a foreign port . . . .” 46 U.S.C. § 55102(b) (2006).
8. Merchant Marine Act of 1920 § 27 (Jones Act), 46 U.S.C. § 55102; Passenger Services
Act of 1886 § 8, 46 U.S.C. § 55103.
9. The “merchant marine” refers to a fleet of vessels owned by U.S. civilians that is
tasked with carrying waterborne commerce and serving naval and military purposes when
needed. 46 U.S.C. § 50101(a)(1)–(3) (2006).
10. Id. § 50101(a)(2).
11. E.g., John Bussey, Oil and the Ghost of 1920, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 2012, at B1,
available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100008723963904444335045776498912439
75440 (quoting the CEO of a shipowners’ trade association who claims that the Jones Act
supports 74,000 maritime jobs in the United States).
12. American-flagged vessels incur an average daily operating cost of $20,053, whereas
the average daily operating cost of a foreign-flagged vessel is $7,454. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.
Mar. Admin., Comparison of U.S. and Foreign-Flag Operating Costs 4 (2011), available
at http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Comparison_of_US_and_Foreign_Flag_Operating_
Costs.pdf.
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Quite simply, the coastwise trade laws impede U.S. growth13 and impose
substantial costs on the American economy for the benefit of a politically
favored interest group. Powerful domestic industries with clever lawyers can
work around the laws,14 while foreign mariners making an honest living in
the U.S.–foreign trade can serve only one American port per voyage. Yet the
political will for wholesale repeal of American coastwise trade laws does not
exist,15 and international trade law is riddled with exceptions and grandfa-
ther clauses that shield the coastwise trade laws from trade liberalization.
This Comment argues that Congress, rather than pursuing an elusive
repeal, should reform the coastwise trade laws by enacting a tariff that for-
eign-owned, -operated, or -built vessels would have to pay before being al-
lowed to engage in the coastwise trade. Such reform would introduce foreign
competition at a pace that would accommodate the special interests who
oppose repeal. Part I explains how congressional efforts to promote and
maintain the U.S. merchant marine through a monopoly on coastwise trade
have both failed in their original purpose and damaged American economic
interests. Part II evaluates the plausibility of repeal and proposes tariffication
as a viable reform.
I. Coastwise Trade and the Merchant Marine
The United States ostensibly restricts its coastwise trade in order to re-
serve a captive market for its merchant marine.16 This Part explains the ef-
fects of this policy. Section I.A explores the coastwise trade laws’ economic,
legal, and environmental costs. Section I.B focuses on the supposed benefici-
ary of the coastwise trade laws—the merchant marine—and argues that its
decline, in spite of its monopoly on coastwise trade, justifies reforming the
laws.
A. The Coastwise Trade Laws and Their Cost
In the United States, the coastwise trade is closed to foreigners. Federal
law allows only vessels owned by U.S. citizens to be issued a “certificate of
documentation”17—that is, to fly the U.S. flag. Engaging in coastwise trade
requires a coastwise endorsement—a qualification on the certificate of doc-
umentation, akin to a motorcycle designation on a driver’s license—which is
13. See id.
14. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Section II.A.
16. This rationale was first codified in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, ch. 250, 41 Stat.
988.
17. 46 U.S.C. § 12103(a)–(b) (2006). Although a foreigner may participate in a partner-
ship or corporation that owns an American-flagged vessel, the citizen-ownership requirement
is designed so that a foreigner could not exert actual control over the vessel through such an
entity. See id. § 12103(b)(3)–(4); see also id. § 50501 (containing heightened requirements for
collective ownership of vessels in coastwise trade).
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available only to vessels that are eligible for the certificate18 and built in the
United States.19 As currently codified,20 twin provisions in the coastwise
trade laws prohibit the transportation of merchandise and passengers except
aboard vessels holding these endorsements.21
These “unabashedly protectionist”22 provisions are quite costly. The U.S.
International Trade Commission estimated in 1999 that the Jones Act alone,
which pertains only to the shipment of goods, reduced real national income
by $1.32 billion.23 This is an old problem whose effects have been felt by
many domestic industries over the years. For example, the Pacific Northwest
timber industry of the early 1960s found itself priced out of the East Coast
market by its Western Canadian counterpart, which could employ foreign-
flagged vessels for shipping.24 Midwestern grain farmers were priced out of
the same market in the 1990s.25 Today, our coastwise trade laws benefit Ca-
nada by incentivizing cruise lines to bus passengers from Seattle to Vancou-
ver before embarking on cruises to Alaska.26
Shippers have long contrived such work-arounds. In 1893, Congress in-
serted into the coastwise trade statutes the language restricting foreign ves-
sels from transporting goods “via any foreign port.”27 This was an attempt to
close a loophole created by a pending Ninth Circuit decision, which ulti-
mately held that a shipment of goods from New York to California by way of
Belgium was outside the scope of the coastwise trade laws then in force.28
This reactionary prohibition, however, has failed to prevent the exploitation
of loopholes in the coastwise trade laws. Professor McGeorge, supporting his
18. Vessels less than five net tons and certain barges, if eligible for documentation, need
not actually be documented to receive coastwise endorsements. Id. § 12102(a)–(c).
19. There are a few exceptions to this requirement: vessels captured in war by U.S. citi-
zens, forfeited for breach of U.S. law, or wrecked in U.S. waters and repaired in a U.S. ship-
yard. Id. § 12112.
20. Title 46 of the U.S. Code was overhauled in 2006. Act of Oct. 6, 2006, Pub. L. No.
109–304, 120 Stat. 1485. As a result, recent citations to shipping statutes, including those in
this Comment, differ substantially from older citations to the same statutes.
21. Merchant Marine Act of 1920 § 27 (Jones Act), 46 U.S.C. § 55102; Passenger Services
Act of 1886 § 8, 46 U.S.C. § 55103; see also Lawrence W. Kaye, Governmental Regulation:
Cabotage Regulations, in 10 Benedict on Admiralty § 2.02, at 2-2 (7th ed., Matthew Bender
2011) (“Together, these two laws serve to exclude foreign ships from entering the U.S. coast-
wise trade.”).
22. Marine Carriers Corp. v. Fowler, 429 F.2d 702, 708 (2d Cir. 1970).
23. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import
Restraints: Second Update 1999, at 98 (1999), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publica-
tions/332/pub3201.pdf.
24. Foreign Trade: Keeping up with the Jones Act, Time, Oct. 26, 1962, at 93, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,874561,00.html.
25. See infra text accompanying note 51.
26. Kaye, supra note 21, at 2-2.
27. Act of Feb. 15, 1893, ch. 117, 27 Stat. 455 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 55102(b)
(2006)); accord 46 U.S.C. § 55103(a) (regarding passenger transport).
28. United States v. 250 Kegs of Nails, 61 F. 410, 413 (9th Cir. 1894).
June 2014] Tariffication of the Coastwise Trade Laws 1511
conclusion that the prevailing interpretation of the Jones Act bears no rea-
sonable relation to its original purpose,29 highlights how some—but only
some—industries are able to evade the coastwise trade laws by processing
shipped merchandise in a foreign port. Oil companies, for example, can ship
Alaskan crude to the East Coast via less expensive foreign vessels so long as
the oil passes through an offshore refinery.30 A purveyor of Alaskan snow
crab, however, will have no such luck: even if he sends the crab to Korea for
extensive processing before shipping it back to the United States, the coast-
wise trade laws will apply to him because of how U.S. Customs interprets the
word “different.”31 When the legal consequences of such arbitrary and seem-
ingly inconsistent interpretations are so severe,32 it’s worth considering re-
forms that reduce the cost of being on the wrong side of these unpredictable
interpretations.
Environmentalists have cause for concern as well. The coastwise trade
laws discourage the use of maritime transport for cargo and passengers,
thereby pushing them onto overcrowded roads and railways.33 This harms
the environment, since maritime shipping is the most energy-efficient mode
of transportation.34 To the extent the coastwise trade laws curtail its use and
shippers turn instead to rail and especially trucking, each ton of cargo results
in more pollution per mile moved.
B. The Harm to the Merchant Marine and National Defense
The coastwise trade laws constitute only one chapter in a subtitle of the
U.S. Code dedicated to the merchant marine,35 which characterizes the
29. Robert L. McGeorge, United States Coastwise Trading Restrictions: A Comparison of
Recent Customs Service Rulings with the Legislative Purpose of the Jones Act and the Demands of
a Global Economy, 11 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 62, 63 (1990).
30. See Am. Mar. Ass’n v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 1156, 1162, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (hold-
ing that the act of refining crude oil offshore physically alters the product being shipped and
thus breaks the “continuity of the voyage” for the purposes of the Jones Act), cited in Mc-
George, supra note 29, at 67–71.
31. John E. Elkins, U.S. Customs Serv., Applicability of 46 U.S.C. App. 883 to Transporta-
tion of Crab Parts from Alaska to South Korea Where They Are Processed and then Transported to
California, U.S. Customs & Border Protection 8–10 (Aug. 12, 1988), http://rul-
ings.cbp.gov/hq/1988/109504.doc, cited in McGeorge, supra note 29, at 73–74, 74 nn.50–51.
32. See 46 U.S.C. § 55102(c) (providing for the forfeiture of goods shipped in violation
of the Jones Act).
33. See Sean D. Kennedy, Comment, Short Sea Shipping in the United States—The New
Marine Highways, 33 Tul. Mar. L.J. 203, 205 (2008) (citing statistics pointing to congestion
and lack of capacity on American roads and rails).
34. E.g., Jean-Paul Rodrigue et al., The Geography of Transport Systems 263 (2d
ed. 2009). But see Brad Walker, Nicollet Island Coalition, Big Price—Little Benefit
15–16 (2010), available at http://www.iwla.org/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/2079
(questioning claims that the use of barges on inland waterways is more efficient than the use of
railways).
35. 46 U.S.C. subtit. V.
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coastwise trade monopoly as a “promotional program.”36 How has this pro-
gram fared in promoting the merchant marine? The American merchant
marine traces its origins to colonial times and has been an important player
throughout U.S. naval history.37 Much to Congress’s dismay, the number of
privately owned vessels flagged under U.S. laws has fallen dramatically since
its peak in the years after World War II.38 The market for imports to and
exports from the United States has resoundingly rejected the U.S. merchant
fleet, which carried less than 2 percent of the waterborne portion of that
trade as of 2009.39
In the captive market of the coastwise trade, there also appears to be a
downward trend, although it is less severe. The Maritime Administration
published a series of studies in the mid-2000s that documented a steady
decline in U.S. domestic ocean trade, measured in metric ton-miles.40 In
2005, the secretary of Homeland Security twice waived the operation of the
Jones Act, during the respective aftermaths of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.41
This move, which was “probably unprecedented,”42 reflected the secretary’s
view that the waivers would “facilitate the transportation of oil and refined
petroleum products in and from portions of the United States [devastated]
36. Id. pt. D.
37. Victor G. Hanson & John V. Berry, The Diminution of the Merchant Marine: A Na-
tional Security Risk, 74 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 465, 467–71 (1997).
38. Compare Timothy Semenoro, Comment, The State of Our Seafaring Nation: What
Course Has Congress Laid for the U.S. Maritime Industry?, 25 Tul. Mar. L.J. 355, 365 (2000)
(citing an increase in the size of the privately held U.S. fleet from 644 in 1947 to 1,265 in
1952), with Continuing Examination of U.S.-Flagged Vessels in U.S. Foreign Trade: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard & Mar. Transp. of the H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastruc-
ture, 111th Cong. 4 (2010) [hereinafter Continuing Examination of U.S.-Flagged Vessels] (state-
ment of Rep. Frank A. LoBiondo, Member, Subcomm. on Coast Guard & Mar. Transp.)
(restating Maritime Administration finding that there were 94 U.S.-flagged ships in foreign
commerce as of 2010).
39. Continuing Examination of U.S.-Flagged Vessels, supra note 38, at 1 (statement of Rep.
Elijah E. Cummings, Chairman, Subcomm. on Coast Guard & Mar. Transp.).
40. See Mar. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., U.S. Domestic Ocean Trades 2002, at 1
(2004), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps78744/2002/USDO-Trades.pdf (show-
ing a 16% decline from 1998 to 2002); Mar. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., U.S. Domestic
Ocean Trades 2003, at 1 (2004), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps78744/2003/
USDO-Trades-03.pdf (showing a 5% decline between 1999 and 2003); Mar. Admin., U.S.
Dep’t of Transp., U.S. Domestic Ocean Trades 2004, at 1 (2006), available at http://per-
manent.access.gpo.gov/lps78744/2004/USDO-Trades-04.pdf (showing a 1.4% decline between
2000 and 2004).
41. Waiver of Compliance with Navigation and Inspection Laws, 70 Fed. Reg. 53,236
(Sept. 7, 2005); Waiver of Compliance with Navigation and Inspection Laws, 70 Fed. Reg.
57,611 (Oct. 3, 2005); see also Act of Dec. 27, 1950, ch. 1155, §§ 1–2, 64 Stat. 1120 (current
version at 46 U.S.C. § 501) (authorizing the head of a responsible agency to issue such waivers
when necessary in the interest of the national defense). This also happened after Hurricane
Sandy in 2012. Waiver of Compliance with Navigation Laws, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
(Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/12-5073_DHS_Jones_Act_Waiver_S1_
Signed_11.02.12.pdf.
42. Constantine G. Papavizas & Lawrence I. Kiern, 2005–2006 U.S. Maritime Legislative
Developments, 38 J. Mar. L. & Com. 267, 279 (2007).
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by the hurricanes” and were “necessary in the interest of national defense.”43
So too, ostensibly, is the merchant marine itself.44 Yet the laws that the secre-
tary waived in the name of national defense were enacted “[t]o provide for
the promotion and maintenance of the American merchant marine,”45 the
very thing meant to provide for the national defense. Congress has demon-
strably legislated itself into a conundrum.
The way out is to recognize that the coastwise trade laws simply do not
work very well. If the merchant marine, with America at the mercy of its
shipping rates, cannot be expected to defend the nation against a hurricane,
then the specter of “foreign entities . . . subjecting the United States to eco-
nomic blackmail”46 in the absence of competition from the U.S. fleet seems
like the least of our worries. It is time to reform the coastwise trade laws.
II. A Path to Reform
Recognizing that a repeal of the coastwise trade laws is unlikely despite
the laws’ negative consequences, this Comment proposes reform instead.
Section II.A contends that past attempts to repeal the coastwise trade laws
have failed because they have not sufficiently accommodated the interests of
those who benefit from the current regime. Section II.B argues that tariffica-
tion—the conversion of the legal prohibition into an economically prohibi-
tive tariff—would protect the beneficiaries of the coastwise trade laws and
set the stage for future reform.
A. Resistance to Repeal
The coastwise trade laws harm American consumers.47 Legislators who
recognize this have introduced bills to overturn the Jones Act,48 but unfortu-
nately their efforts have not succeeded.
The Coastal Shipping Competition Act of 1996,49 sponsored in part by
Senator Helms of North Carolina—a coastal state whose constituents might
be thought to benefit from the coastwise trade laws—was introduced to
“eliminate a harmful anachronism that enables a few waterborne carriers to
cling to a monopoly on shipping.”50 The anachronism—the Jones Act—had
43. Waiver of Compliance with Navigation and Inspection Laws, 70 Fed. Reg. at 57,612.
44. 46 U.S.C. § 50101(a) (“It is necessary for the national defense . . . that the United
States have a merchant marine.”).
45. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-261, 41 Stat. 988.
46. Hanson & Berry, supra note 37, at 485.
47. See supra Section I.A.
48. Although the coastwise trade laws encompass both the Jones Act and the Passenger
Services Act, the Jones Act receives much more attention. This may be due to the difference in
penalty. See infra text accompanying notes 76–78.
49. H.R. 4006, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 1813, 104th Cong. (1996).
50. 142 Cong. Rec. 12,431 (1996). The bill would have repealed the U.S.-flagging and
-build requirements for ships engaged in noninland coastwise trade on the condition that the
secretary of transportation determine that the foreign ship’s country of origin grant “recipro-
cal privileges” to American ships engaged in that country’s coastwise trade. Constantine G.
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driven the price of domestic grain shipments so high that North Carolina
poultry and pork farmers found themselves turning to foreign sources for
feed grain instead of buying it from the Midwest.51 The bill gained very little
support, however, and did not make it to the floor of either chamber of
Congress.52 Subsequent attempts to repeal or amend certain parts of the
Jones Act likewise failed to gain traction, while a resolution supporting the
Jones Act attracted a House majority as sponsors.53 Resistance to a Jones Act
repeal seemed insurmountable.
The issuance of Jones Act waivers during the 2005 hurricane season54
might have signaled a new appetite for repeal. Another Gulf of Mexico disas-
ter five years later, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, again prompted calls for
a waiver and claims that the Jones Act prevented a rapid maritime re-
sponse.55 Addressing these charges, Senator McCain introduced the Open
America’s Waters Act,56 which would have “fully repeal[ed] the Jones Act.”57
It too died in committee,58 suggesting the continued impossibility of a full
repeal.
The coastwise trade laws are classic examples of legislation that serves a
concentrated group of politically motivated beneficiaries while thwarting an
economically competitive but politically weak group of business interests.59
The costs are widely dispersed among consumers, who likely vote their con-
sciences on more visible issues. This is why each of the past five presidents
has spoken in support of the Jones Act60: it’s politically safe to do so. As
desirable as repeal may be, any effort to mitigate the coastwise trade laws’
Papavizas & Bryant E. Gardner, Is the Jones Act Redundant?, 21 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 95, 111 &
nn.119–20 (2008–2009).
51. 142 Cong. Rec. 12,431 (1996).
52. Papavizas & Gardner, supra note 50, at 111 & n.121.
53. Id. at 111–12; H.R. Con. Res. 65, 105th Cong. (1997); see also United States Noncon-
tiguous Shipping Open Market Act of 2003, H.R. 2845, 108th Cong. (2003). This bill died in
committee. United States Noncontiguous Shipping Open Market Act of 2003, GovTrack, http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/hr2845 (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
54. Supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
55. E.g., Editorial, The President Does a Jones Act, Wall St. J., June 19, 2010, at A12,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704324304575306881766723718.
html#articleTabs%3Darticle. For example, skimming equipment flown in from the Nether-
lands had to be attached to American ships assisting in the cleanup effort because there was no
waiver of the Jones Act’s restrictions on the involvement of foreign-built ships.
56. S. 3525, 111th Cong. (2010).
57. 156 Cong. Rec. S5,322 (daily ed. June 23, 2010) (statement of Sen. John McCain).
58. Open America’s Waters Act, GovTrack, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/
s3525 (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
59. John Kemp, Jones Act Is Set to Stay, Reuters (May 2, 2013, 9:43 AM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2013/05/02/column-kemp-us-shipping-idUSL6N0DJ38A20130502; cf.
Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 397, 404–06
(sketching the dairy industry’s successful quest for legislation to eliminate the competitive
threat posed by filled milk in the 1920s).
60. Statements of Support, Am. Mar. P’ship, http://www.americanmaritimepartner-
ship.com/statements.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
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consequences must win approval from at least part of the maritime lobby.
To attract this support, reform should retain some degree of protectionism.
B. Tariffication: A First Step
A template for reform can be drawn from the example of international
trade law, which has facilitated a boom in world exports over the past several
decades.61 The coastwise trade laws are a nontariff barrier to trade,62 resem-
bling the agricultural protectionism that prevailed across the globe when the
Agreement on Agriculture63 was negotiated in 1994. The General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, in effect since 1947, had eliminated most quantitative
restrictions but exempted nontariff barriers on agricultural products.64 As a
result, “[a]gricultural protectionism . . . played hooky from global trade re-
forms for decades.”65 The Agreement on Agriculture finally addressed the
problem of nontariff barriers by forbidding members (such as the United
States) to “maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind which
have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties.”66
61. See World Trade Org., International Trade Statistics 2011, at 202 (2011),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2011_e/its2011_e.pdf (showing value
of world exports in 2010 at approximately 145 times the value of those in 1950).
62. Broadly speaking, any policy other than a tariff that restricts the quantity of a good
that is imported or exported into a country. A classic example is the import quota.
63. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410.
64. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XI, para. 2(c), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A11, A33, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. The coastwise trade laws have an interest-
ing relationship with international trade law—the U.S.-build requirement has its very own
grandfather clause. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 para. 3(a), Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S.
190, 191 [hereinafter GATT 1994] (“The provisions of . . . GATT 1994 shall not apply to
measures taken by a Member . . . before it became a contracting party to GATT 1947, that
prohibit[ ] the use, sale or lease of foreign-built or foreign-reconstructed vessels in commercial
applications between points in national waters.”). This Comment proposes tariffication as a
unilateral trade reform but is not unaware of the leverage that a tarrified Jones Act might lend
to hitherto unsuccessful negotiations about liberalizing maritime transportation (including
coastwise) through international trade law. For more on past efforts in this field, see Benjamin
Parameswaran, The Liberalization of Maritime Transport Services 249, 254–56,
277–82 (2004).
65. Jeffrey J. Steinle, Note, The Problem Child of World Trade: Reform School for Agricul-
ture, 4 Minn. J. Global Trade 333, 333 (1995).
66. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 63, art. 4.2, at 413. In a footnote, the Agree-
ment specified that the measures “required to be converted into ordinary customs duties”
include “quantitative import restrictions” and other nontariff barriers. Id. at 413 & n.1. The
present perfect tense in Article 4.2, although peculiar, does operate as a mandate. The WTO
Appellate Body interpreted this provision simply to signify that tariffication “began during the
Uruguay Round . . . to be recorded in Members’ draft WTO Schedules by the conclusion of
those negotiations.” Appellate Body Report, Chile—Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, para. 206, WT/DS207/AB/R (Sept. 23, 2002), availa-
ble at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds207_e.htm.
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This—the conversion of nontariff barriers into “ordinary customs du-
ties,” or tariffs—is tariffication, “perhaps the most significant aspect of the
entire Agreement.”67 For every nontariff barrier, a “tariff equivalent” was to
be calculated “using the actual difference between internal and external
prices,”68 generally meaning “a representative wholesale price . . . in the do-
mestic market” (the internal price)69 and the actual or estimated value of the
equivalent imported good.70 The purpose of tariffication was “to enhance
transparency and predictability in agricultural trade, establish or strengthen
the link between domestic and world markets, and allow for a progressive
negotiated reduction of protection in agricultural trade.”71
Tariffication could work for coastwise trade as well. In its initial stages,
reform could be designed effectively to prohibit foreign vessels from engag-
ing in the coastwise trade, thereby preventing a shock to the mariners whose
jobs the law currently attempts to protect. The tariff would be gradually
reduced over time. While this Comment proposes unilateral reform because
of the benefits to the domestic economy,72 the promise of such a reduction
could be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations with other countries that
currently protect their own coastwise trade.
Such a reform could constrain America’s flexibility to some degree. For
example, reforming the U.S.-build requirement may jeopardize the require-
ment’s grandfathered status under GATT 1994.73 The grandfather clause,
however, allows amendments to nonconforming provisions, such as the
Jones Act, to the extent that they “do[ ] not decrease [their] conformity”
with the national-treatment and other provisions of the original GATT.74
Bringing foreign competition into the coastwise trade would increase our
conformity—international trade law only prohibits differential treatment
for foreign-built vessels on internal taxes and regulations,75 not on charging
a tariff for admission to the domestic market.
67. Joseph A. McMahon, The WTO Agreement on Agriculture 33 (2006).
68. Negotiating Group on Market Access, Modalities for the Establishment of Specific
Binding Commitments Under the Reform Programme, Annex 3, § A, para. 2, MTN.GNG/MA/
W/24 (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Modalities Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/en-
glish/tratop_e/agric_e/1993_ur_modalities_w24_e.pdf.
69. Id. para. 6.
70. Id. para. 4.
71. Panel Report, Chile—Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain
Agricultural Products, para. 7.15, WT/DS207/R (May 3, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds207_e.htm, quoted in McMahon, supra note 67, at 35; see
also Alan V. Deardorff, Tariffication in Services, in Issues and Options for U.S.–Japan
Trade Policies 107, 108 (Robert M. Stern ed., 2002).
72. See supra Part I.
73. See supra note 64.
74. See GATT 1994, supra note 64, para. 3(a), at 191 (citing GATT 1947, supra note 64,
pt. II, at A18–65).
75. See GATT 1947, supra note 64, art. III, at A18–19 (codifying the principle of national
treatment).
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A posttariffication Jones Act would, in fact, look much like the current
Passenger Services Act. The penalty for transporting merchandise in the
coastwise trade without a coastwise endorsement—in other words, for vio-
lating the Jones Act—is “seizure by and forfeiture to the Government.”76
The Passenger Services Act, wisely avoiding the constitutional limitations on
the forfeiture of persons,77 sets the penalty for violating its provisions at
“$300 for each passenger transported and landed.”78 This is, in effect, a
tariff—and, in the spirit of reform, it should be re-characterized as such.
The United States already has a Harmonized Tariff Schedule in place for
imported merchandise.79 Instead of being barred from transporting mer-
chandise in the coastwise trade, foreign vessels could simply be allowed to
pay tariffs on the transported merchandise at the most-favored-nation rate,
perhaps multiplied by some constant, in order to engage in the coastwise
trade. The forfeiture penalty for violating the Jones Act could be replaced
with a fine equal to the value of the goods being transported. This would
introduce flexibility and transparency into the coastwise trade laws so that
legislators could adjust them and foreign shippers could quantify them as a
cost of doing business in the new market.
Conclusion
Repealing the coastwise trade laws is virtually impossible, but we should
still pursue other solutions. Tariffication gives Congress a way to admit com-
petition to the coastwise trade—benefiting the Americans who use it—while
affording the domestic industry time to adapt. America should welcome
maritime genius, no matter its origin. Reforming our coastwise trade laws
would be a promising start.
76. 46 U.S.C. § 55102(c) (2006). The alternative statutory penalty—the greater of “the
value of the merchandise . . . or the actual cost of the transportation”—might be called tariffi-
cation by waiver. Id. Total forfeiture remains the default penalty, however, and any true tariffi-
cation would necessitate removing this penalty.
77. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.
78. 46 U.S.C. § 55103(b).
79. See 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2012).
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